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Least Restrictive Means:

A CLEAR PATH FOR USER-BASED
REGULATION OF MINORS' ACCESS TO
INDECENT MATERIAL ON THE INTERNET
I. INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment guarantees to Americans the freedom to communicate or
express themselves in a public forum.' Such a principle of free expression will permit
both elevated, and unfortunately, unelevated forms of communication in American
society. Of course, there are exceptions to the First Amendment's grant of free speech.
One exception focuses on protecting minors from harmful or indecent forms of
communication. 2 Society recognizes that some forms of communication that are suitable
for adults are not suitable for minors who lack maturity and emotional development.
Prior to the 1990s, legislators had been effective at drafting statutes that prevented
minors from obtaining access to harmful forms of communication, while preserving
adult access to such communication, thus avoiding a violation of the First Amendment.
For instance, in Ginsberg v. New York, the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute
that prohibited the sale of pornographic material to those under the age of seventeen. 4
Although appellant challenged the constitutionality of the statute, the Supreme Court
upheld it because, even though minors were not given access to pornographic material,
adults could still obtain such material if they wished.5 Thus, Ginsberg places a burden
on New York merchants who sell pornographic magazines to make certain they do not
sell to minors.6 Such a burden is reasonable because shop owners can observe the
persons to whom they sell pornographic material since such transactions take place in
the context of the physical world, characterized by "geography" and "identity."7
In the 1990s, however, a new frontier has emerged in which throngs of people are
interacting with one another, not in the physical world, but in the "electronic world"

1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech..
2. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-639 (1968).
3. See id. at 633-34.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 634.
6. See id. at 631-32.
7. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 889 (1997) [hereinafter Reno III. (citing
Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace,45 EMORY L.J. 869, 886 (1996)).
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known as the Internet. As Justice O'Connor asserts in Reno II, "The electronic world is
fundamentally different [than the physical world]. Because it is no more than the
interconnection of electronic parties, cyberspace allows speakers and listeners to mask
their identities." 9 Indeed, the Internet has particularly heightened minors' access to
pornographic material causing the government to argue, "With as many as 8,000
sexually explicit sites on the World Wide Web alone. .. the Internet threatens to render
irrelevant all prior efforts to protect children from indecent material." 1 ° Although
somewhat hyperbolic, the government's fears certainly highlight an emerging problem:
How can American society prevent minors from obtaining access to indecent material
on the Internet while maintaining adult access to such material?"
Part I will examine how Congress has attempted to solve the problem of minors'
access to indecent material on the Internet through the passage of legislation, which will
be followed by an analysis of the factors which account for the legislation's failure.
Congress's first legislative attempt was Title V of the Telecommunications Act known
as the "Communications Decency Act" ("CDA"). 12 Congress's second legislative
attempt was the "Child On-Line Protection Act" ("COPA"). 13 The CDA was held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court for violating the First Amendment" and the
COPA was enjoined by the Third Circuit for its likely violation of the First
Amendment. '5
Part II will examine alternative approaches to prevent minors' access to harmful
communication on the Internet measured against the Supreme Court's analysis of the
CDA and the Third Circuit's analysis of the COPA. One alternative approach would be
to have speakers, commercial and non-commercial, regulate themselves through the use
of adult identification pass codes or through a credit card number ("speaker-based
regulation"). The other alternative would require parents to use protective software to
regulate minors' access to harmful sites on the Internet ("user-based regulation"). Userbased regulation successfully deals with the deficiencies of the CDA and COPA,
without significant drawbacks. 6 Speaker-based regulation, however, contains many of
the same problems associated with the CDA and COPA.

8.
number
9.
10.

See id. at 850. The Court found that, "About 40 million people used the Internet at the time of trial, a
that is expected to mushroom to 200 million by 1999." Id.
Id. at 889.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, 1997 U.S. TRANS. Lexis 40, Reno v. American Civil Liberties

Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-511) (Mar. 19, 1997).
11. This paper does not argue against Congressional regulation of material on the Internet that is not
protected under the First Amendment as to both adults and minors, such as, child pornography and obscenity.
12. 47 U.S.C. §223 (1994).
13. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
14. See Reno I1,521 U.S. at 884.
15. See American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 181 (2000) [hereinafter Reno 111]. See
Miller, L. Heather, Note, Strike Two: An Analysis of the Child Online protection Act's Constitutional Failures,
52 FED. COMM. L.J. 155 (1999), for an examination of the CDA and/or COPA's constitutional failure in the
federal courts.
16. See Harvard Law Review Association, Internet Regulation Through Architectural Modification: The
Property Rule Structure of Code Solutions, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1639-1643, for an examination of some
pros and cons of private filtering software.
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II. THE CDA AND COPA

A. The CDA
Congress's first attempt to regulate minors' access to harmful material on the
Internet was through two provisions of the CDA.' 7 In Reno II, the Supreme Court had
the opportunity to examine the constitutionality of the two provisions of the CDA. is The
Court summarized the two provisions: "§ 223 (a)(1)(B)(ii) criminalizes the 'knowing'
9
transmission of 'obscene or indecent' messages to any recipient under 18 years of age"
(known as the "indecent transmission" provision) and § 223 (d) "prohibits the knowin[g]
sending or displaying to a person under 18 of any message 'that, in context, depicts or
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs . . .' (known as the "patently
offensive display" provision). 2
After distinguishing several cases put forth by the government in support of its
position, the Court faults the CDA for using two different and undefined standards upon
which to identify the prohibited communication.2 The CDA's failure to define
"indecent" and "patently offensive" leaves those who communicate on the Internet
uncertain as to the meaning of those terms and uncertain as to the relation, if any, those
terms have to each other.22 The Court inquires, "[c]ould a speaker confidently assume
that a serious discussion about birth control practices, homosexuality . . . or the
'
consequences of prison rape violate the CDA?" 23
The Court held that this linguistic
ambiguity, considered in addition to the criminal sanctions imposed for violations of the
CDA, would serve to hinder or "chill" speech on the Internet because speakers would
withhold potentially indecent communication, rather than risk a violation of the CDA.24
This chilling of speech on the Internet is of serious constitutional concern because the
CDA regulates content.25 Regulation of speech based on content is subject to strict
scrutiny analysis which requires a tight nexus between the government's purpose and
the means by which the government attempts to achieve its purpose.26 The Court held:
We are persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment
requires when a statute regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors
access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large
amount of speech that adults have a Constitutional right to receive and to address

17. See 47 U.S.C. §223(a)(l)(B)(ii) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
18. See 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
19. Id. at 859.
20. Id. at 859-60.
21. See id. at 871.
22. Id. The Court found that "indecent" does not, "benefit from any textual embellishment at all," and
that "patently offensive" is qualified only to the extent that it involves "sexual or excretory activities or
organs" taken "in context" and "measured by contemporary community standards." Reno 11,
521 U.S. at 871
n.35.
23. Id. at 871.
24. See Reno If, 521 U.S. at 872.
25. See id. at 871.
26. See, e.g., Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980).
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27
to one another.

Here, the Court demonstrates its unwillingness to risk blocking adult access to
speech that will likely follow from the vague provisions of the CDA.
Applying the CDA to the Internet's unique structure would also inhibit adult
access to constitutionally protected speech. The Supreme Court, quoting the district
court, found, "that at the time of trial existing technology did not include any effective
method for a sender to prevent minors from obtaining access to its communications on
the Internet without also denying access to adults.' '28 The Court further held, the district
court found "no effective way to determine the age of a user who is accessing material
through e-mail, mail explorer, newsgroups, or chat rooms.,, 29 Here, the Court wholly
debunks Congress's attempt to regulate through statutory provisions by asserting that
the CDA is unworkable because, in many cases, it is not possible to determine the age of
Internet users. Thus, the only effective means of denying minors access to indecent
communication would be to deny access to everyone.
There are other reasons, albeit less noticeable, that account for the CDA's failure.
The Court seemingly possesses a bias against regulation on the Internet; favoring
instead, private regulation through protective software. 30 The Court held, ". . . [t]he
[CDA's] burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be
at least as effective in achieving the Act's legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted
to preserve.",31 Here, the Court intimates that Congress should yield to parental
regulation of the Internet because it will be less restrictive than a statute that bases its
preclusion of speech on cryptic standards. Additionally, the Court held that there is no32
indication that protective software would be less effective than statutory regulation.
Also, the Court indicates that parents, under the CDA, could not allow their children to
view material on the Internet that is patently offensive or indecent even if the parents
33
believe the material has redeeming value.
The Court's bias against top down regulation on the Internet is also evident in a
section of the case devoted to an explanation of the Internet. 34 This section demonstrates
the Court's awe of this new medium's exponential growth and unparalleled opportunity
to bring millions of people together through electronic communication. 35 For example,
the Supreme Court, citing the district court, held, "at any given time 'tens of thousands
of users are engaging in conversations on a huge range of subjects.' It is 'no
exaggeration to conclude that the content of the Internet is as diverse as human
27. Reno 1I, 521 U.S. at 874.
28. Id. at 876 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 824, 845 (E.D. Pa.,1996) [hereinafter Reno 1].
29. Id.
30. See Reno 1, 929 F.Supp. at 877-884. Judge Dalzell makes a compelling argument that the unique
characteristics of the Internet make regulation of it difficult if not impossible. Indeed, in support of his stance
against the government's attempt to regulate the Internet through the CDA, he asserts, "Just as the strength of
the Internet is chaos, so the strength of our liberty depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered
speech the First Amendment protects." Id.
31. Reno M, 521 U.S. at 874.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 878.
34. See id. at 850-52.
35. See id.
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thought." 36 Here, the Court exposed its psyche showing that it holds the Internet in such
high esteem that it describes it like no other medium; one that is tantamount to the
complexity and diversity of the human mind. After such an assertion, it seems unlikely
that the Court would impede this novel and useful medium through broad regulation.
Another indication that the Court is biased against Congressional regulation of the
Internet is the Court's comparison of the Internet to the broadcast medium. 37 The Court
held that the broadcast medium was subject to an extensive history of past regulation.38
In contrast to the broadcast medium, the Court held, "[n]either before nor after the
enactment of the CDA have the vast democratic forums of the Internet been subject to
the type of government supervision and regulation that has attended the broadcast
industry. 39 In the above excerpt, by stating that the Internet has not been subject to
extensive regulation, the Court is implying that it is unwilling to regulate it now. Of
course, this reasoning is tautological; a new medium will never be regulated if courts
preclude its regulation based on the principle that it has not yet been regulated. Thus, the
Court is even willing to engage in circular reasoning to justify its refusal to regulate the
Internet. Moreover, in the same excerpt, the Court describes the Internet as democratic;
a word that contains a positive aura of liberty which stands in contrast to government
regulation.
In its review of the CDA the Court does not conjecture that perhaps the statute would
pass constitutional muster if technological advances made it possible and economical to
determine the ages of Internet users. 4° Instead, the Court advocated a new course of
regulation through parental control when it held, "[b]y contrast, the District Court found
that '[d]espite its limitations, currently available user-based software suggests that a
reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent their children from accessing
sexually explicit and other material which parents may believe is inappropriate for their
children will soon be widely available.' ,,4In other words, the Court is indirectly telling
Congress to relinquish its legislative efforts to prevent minors from accessing harmful
material on the Internet that adults have a protected right to view because parental
control software will soon supplant the perceived need for statutory regulation.
B. COPA
Congress's second attempt to regulate minors' access to the Internet was through the
Child Online Protection Act ("COPA"), which prohibits any person from, "knowingly
and with knowledge of the character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce
by means of the World Wide Web, mak[ing] any communication for commercial
purposes that is available to any minor and that includes any material that is harmful to
36. Id. at 852 (quoting Reno 1, 929 F.Supp. at 842).
521 U.S. at 867.
37. See Reno 1I,
38. See id.
39. Id. at 868-69 (citation omitted).
40. See id. at 889. Justice O'Connor, however, in her concurring and dissenting opinion, indicates that
she would uphold a regulation of the Internet based on effective zoning insofar as it does not interfere with the
First Amendment Rights of Adults. See id. O'Connor also states that the Court reviewed the CDA in the
context of the Internet as it existed at the time of Trial. See id. However, the Court did not go out of its way to
suggest that it would uphold Congressional regulation even if technology made it feasible.
41. Id. at 877 (citing Reno 1, 929 F.Supp. at 842).
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minors.
Upon passage of the COPA, the American Civil Liberties Union filed for an
injunction against its enforcement, which was granted by the district court. 43 On appeal,
the issue came before the Third Circuit in American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno
("ACLU"). 44 The court noted that Congress attempted to draft COPA more narrowly
than the CDA by limiting its coverage to "material on the web as opposed to the Internet
as a whole" and to commercial communication. 45 The court also acknowledged that the
government attempted to clear up the linguistic ambiguity, which engendered the CDA's
demise under the First Amendment, by limiting the 46 measure of prohibited
communication to that material which is "harmful to minors.
The "harmful to minors" standard could only be met if the communication satisfied a
47
Thus, harmful to minors
three-part test that was modified from Miller v. California.
under the COPA is defined as §231 (e)(6) "any communication ... that is obscene or that
- (A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find...
is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interests; '48 (B) depicts,
describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual
(C) "taken a whole, lacks serious
or stimulated sexual act or sexual contact.,
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors."5° This three-part test was
incorporated into COPA for the express purpose of overcoming the vagueness
associated with Congress's failure to define the "indecent transmission" provision5' and
the "patently offensive display" provision52 of the CDA.53 The main problem with
Congress's strategy, however, was that by incorporating the Miller factors into COPA,
it, in effect, attempted to apply a test to the electronic world that was designed to
regulate the physical world. The Court acknowledged that Congress was aware that
applying a community standards test that was designed for the physical world as a
means to measure prohibited communication in the electronic world was
"controversial. 54 The government contends, however, that, "there is nothing dispositive
about the fact that [in COPA] commercial distribution of such [harmful] materials
occurs through an online, rather than a brick and mortar outlet."5 5 Nonetheless, the Court
expressed disagreement with the government's contention that the electronic world
could be reconciled with the physical world through a non-geographic test for material
42. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 167 (2000) (citing 47 U.S.C. §231 (a) (1))
[hereinafter Reno IV].

43. See id. at 165-66.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 167.
46. See id. at 167.
47. See id. at 167 (citing Miller v. California,413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
48. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
49. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
50. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)(C) (Supp. IV 1998).
51. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (Supp. I 1994).
52.
53.
54.
55.
(2000)).

See 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (Supp. It 1994).
See Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 167-68.
See id. at 174 (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 28 (1998)).
Id. (citing Brief for Appellant at 18 n. 3, American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162
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that is harmful to minors.56
The Court held that the key difference between the Internet and the physical world is
the existence of boundaries. 57 In the physical world, there is a clear demarcation
between the point at which one geographical location begins and at which it ends;
whereas the Internet is essentially without such boundaries.58 In Miller, the Court upheld
a statue that required the appellant to alter the content of the material he was mailing
depending on the standards of the recipient's community because he had control over
what communities would receive his materials. 59 In contrast, a dispenser of material on
the Internet cannot control who will gain access to the material because the Internet is
without boundaries.60 Communicators on the Internet cannot refuse access to selected
areas because such segments or partitioned areas do not currently exist. Indeed, the
Third Circuit held that because communicators on the Internet cannot control whom
their communications will reach they will be forced to communicate at the standard set
by the most conservative community.62 Thus, applying a community standards test to an
electronic world lacking distinct communities can only be effectual if the legal system
creates an artificial, monolithic community, incorporating all geographic areas that have
access to the Internet. This effectively amounts to totalitarian governance of the Internet
by the community espousing the most prudent values; hardly the democratic enterprise
described by the Supreme Court in Reno 11.63
The government attempted to preserve the CDA and COPA from the "strong
medicine" 64 of the First Amendment by inserting affirmative defenses into both statutes.
The CDA gives an affirmative defense to those who take "good faith, reasonable,
effective, and appropriate actions" to restrict access by minors to the prohibited
communications. 65 The CDA also offers an affirmative defense to those who require
proof of age through an adult identification number or code or credit card.66 The COPA
has a similar affirmative defense provision which provides that if a Web publisher, "has
restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to minors through use of a credit
card ...

adult personal identification number ... then no liability will attach to the web

publisher even if a minor should nevertheless gain access to the restricted material under
COPA. ' '67 By inserting these provisions into both statutes the government intended to
encourage web communicators dispensing indecent material to block minors' access.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Reno H held that installing such age verification
technology would be prohibitively costly and burdensome for noncommercial

56. See id. at 174-75.
57. See id. at 175 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 31 F.Supp.2d 473, 482-92 (E.D. Pa., 1999) [hereinafter Reno
111]; See American Libraries Association v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp. 160, 169 (S.D. NY, 1997) which states that
"geography, however, is a virtually meaningless construct on the Internet.").
58. See id.
59. See Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 175.
60. See id. (citing Reno II1, 31 F.Supp.2d at 484).
61. See id.
62. See id. at 177 (citing Reno 11, 521 U.S. at 877-78).
63. See Reno I, 521 U.S. at 867.
64. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 177 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,613 (1973)).
65. Reno 1!, 521 U.S. at 844 (citing § 223(e)(5)(A)).
66. See id.
67. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 170 n.14 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)).
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speakers. 68 Moreover, commercial providers of indecent material even with
identification requirements could not be certain that minors were sufficiently precluded
from gaining access to their sites, thus rendering such identification measures
irrelevant. 69 Indeed, the Supreme Court held, "IT] he government failed to adduce any
evidence that these verification techniques actually preclude minors from posing as
adults., 70 In other words, age verification systems do not work well enough to satisfy
the government's interest of protecting minors from indecent material on the Internet.
Perhaps the greatest argument against the CDA and COPA involves their limited
jurisdiction. The CDA and COPA may prevent Internet speakers in the United States
from exposing minors to indecent or patently offensive communication, but they would
not prevent foreign communicators from doing so because they do not fall within the
purview of the statutes. 71 During oral argument in Reno II, appellee estimated that fifty
percent of indecent speech in cyberspace is posted in foreign countries. 72 Thus, even
assuming that the CDA and COPA effectively prevented minors from obtaining access
to harmful materials posted in the United States, minors would still have access to a
plethora of indecent speech posted in foreign countries.73 Moreover, the COPA only
applies to commercial speakers, which leaves minors unprotected against
noncommercial speakers.74 In light of foreign postings under the CDA and COPA and
noncommercial speakers under COPA, the government's interest in protecting minors'
from indecent material on the Internet would not have been met. This reality led the
Third Circuit in ACLU, to hold:
[E]ven if we were to overlook the unconstitutional overbreadth of the COPA
"contemporary community standards" test and if COPA were to be deemed
effective, it still would not eliminate much of the harmful material which a minor
could access. For example, minors would still access harmful material
published
75
by non-commercial Web publishers, and by foreign web publishers.
Since Congress's statutory attempts to prevent children from obtaining access to
indecent material on the Internet failed strict scrutiny analysis, it is important to consider
alternative approaches. Two alternatives are speaker-based and user-based regulation
which will be considered in turn.
Ill. SPEAKER-BASED VERSUS USER-BASED REGULATION
A. Speaker-Based Regulation
Speaker-based regulation places the onus on those who disseminate or display
68. See Reno II, 521 U.S. at 881-82.

69. See id. at 882.
70. Id.
71. See Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 177 n.21.
72. Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, 1997 U.S. TRANS. Lexis 40, Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-511) (Mar. 19, 1997).
73. Reno IV, 217 F.3d. at 177 n.21.
74. See id. at 167.
75. Id. at 177 n.21.
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material on the Internet to screen out minors through identification codes, credit card
numbers and other types of profiling. In Reno II, Justice O'Connor describes speakerbased regulation as a species of adult zoning on the Internet.76 Justice O'Connor writes,
[Ilt is possible to construct barriers in cyberspace and use them to screen for
identity, making cyberspace more like the physical world, and consequently more
amenable to zoning law.. .Internet speakers (users who post material on the
Internet) have begun to zone cyberspace itself through the use of "gateway"

technology. Such technology requires Internet users to enter information
about
77
themselves ... before they can access certain areas of cyberspace.

Despite Justice O'Connor's apparent enthusiasm for speaker-based regulation, it is

important to note that speaker-based regulation poses a similar threat to the democratic
structure of the Internet as do the COPA and CDA. As previously mentioned, installing
such systems would be costly for speakers, especially noncommercial speakers who
would perhaps be rendered mute by such a legislative demand for speaker-based
regulation. 78 Although adult identification PINS are considerably less expensive than
credit card verification, both types of regulation require a reorganization and
maintenance fee. 79 Thus, the costs and inconvenience of such a system may dissuade
some speakers from using the Internet, which, like the CDA and COPA, would
effectively deprive adults of protected speech.
Speaker regulation prevents adult access to constitutionally protected material on
the Internet in other ways as well. The Third Circuit in ACLU held:
[Bloth credit card and age verification systems require an individual seeking to
access material otherwise permissible to adults to reveal personal statistics.
Because many adults will choose not to reveal these personal details, those
otherwise frequently visited Web sites will experience "a loss of traffic." This
loss of traffic in turn would "inflict economic" harm upon the particular
8
website. 0

Here, two problems with communicator regulation are highlighted by the Court.
First, the embarrassment and shame of revealing personal information prior to entering

an indecent site will cause many adults to avoid such sights. 8' Thus, identification
measures will preclude adult access to protected speech. 2 Although this preclusion is
psychological, rather than legal, it still produces the same undesired effect of preventing
adults from accessing protected speech in cyberspace. 83 Second, the reduction in traffic
76. See Reno 11, 521 U.S. 844, 890 (1997).
77. Id; See also, Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, 1997 U.S. TRANS. Lexis 40, Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-511) (Mar. 19, 1997). Appellees assert that most web sites,
including the "12 million ... who gain access through... the major online service providers" do not have CGI
Script, which is necessary to screen for age. Id. Thus, Justice O'Connor's assertion that the Internet can be
zoned to emulate the physical world has yet to be proven sufficiently workable. Moreover, in the physical
world speakers are visible; in the electronic world speakers are not visible. Hence, it seems unrealistic to
assume that CGI Script will magically make screening minors on the Internet as efficient as screening minors
in the physical world. Lastly, even if it were the case that the Internet could be zoned to emulate the physical
world, would not such an outcome spoil the unique, amorphous medium the world has come to revere?
78. See Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 170-71 (citing Reno 1,929 F.Supp. at 490).
79. See id.
80. Id. (citing Reno 1, 929 F.Supp. at 461).
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.

Journalof Legislation

[Vol. 27:1

will hurt the business of commercial speakers increasing the likelihood that they will
shut down, thus depriving adult access to protected speech. 84 Thus, speaker-based
regulation fails to sufficiently deal with the main problem confronting the CDA and
COPA, that is, the maintenance of adult access to constitutionally protected material on
the Internet.
B. User-Based Regulation
Protective software, such as Net Nanny and Cyber Patrol, presents a viable
alternative to the dangers of Congressional regulation. 85 Protective Software will prevent
the browser from downloading content deemed inappropriate for minors by either the
software company or parents. 86 The software can be periodically updated to counter the
Internet's rapid growth. 87 The primary benefit of protective software is that it does not
suffer from the deficiencies of the CDA and COPA. First, protective software does not
prevent adults from gaining access to indecent material on the Internet because it is a
privately, rather than, a governmentally controlled measure. Adults can override denial
of access by use of a password.88 Second, the success of privately maintained software
does not depend on the illusive task of erecting untenable artificial borders on the
Internet. Third, private software is not as costly to the individual user as identification
systems are to speakers. 89 Fourth, private software would effectively close up the
foreign posting loophole. 90 Fifth, private software allows parents, not the government as
proscribed by the CDA, to determine what information on the Internet is suitable for
their children. 9' Most parents would favor this discretion in light of the fact that they are
responsible for their children's development.
There are arguments against reliance on user regulation software. The government
during oral argument in Reno II argued that such software will potentially block access
to sites that are protected for minors. 92 But as Appellee, rebutted, "[T]hat's not a First
Amendment problem. That's a parental judgment issue., 93 Further, the government fails
to explain how the CDA or COPA will not have the same effect. At least in userregulated software the minors deprived of speech are from the class of people who
engendered the need for regulation. Under the CDA and COPA, however, adults were

84. See Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 170-71.
85. See Jonathon Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J., 453-455 (1997).
86. See Commission on Child Online Protection (COPA), Report to Congress 21 (2000).
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 90, 1997 U.S. TRANS. Lexis 40, Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-511) (Mar. 19, 1997). Compare Reno 11, 521 U.S. at 881-82.
The cost to speakers of screening for minors would in many cases be prohibitive, thus precluding them from
using the Internet. In contrast, the cost of private software to users would not be so great as to preclude them
from using the Internet. Moreover, this could be an area of limited government intervention, in which,
Congress could subsidize the purchase of private software for low-income families.
90. See id.
91. See Reno 1I, 521 U.S. at 878.
92. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, 1997 U.S. TRANS. Lexis 40, Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-511) (Mar. 19, 1997).
93. Id.
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deprived of speech, even though the need for regulation did not transpire for their
protection.
Another argument against user regulation is put forth by anti-pornography activists
who assert that: "[S]uch software 'leaves the parent... responsible to go out and buy
the software, become educated about how to apply it, how to install it, how to use it, and
how to then monitor it to make sure your child or his friends have not gotten around
it." 94 Although this argument has some merit, the decision to use legislative regulation
versus self-regulation should not rise or fall on the indolence of parents. Parenting is
difficult in all facets of life, such as making sure children do not eat too much sugar.
Even though children can surreptitiously obtain candy and eat it against parental wishes
most Americans would not call for government regulation of children's access to candy.
Another argument against user-based regulation is the glitches in the accuracy of
protective software and the confusion over how the development of the next generation
of software should proceed. 95 Although software protection has some problems, it will
only improve with time. Indeed, "President Clinton has pledged to 'vigorously support'
the development . . . of filtering software." 96 Moreover, the Commission On Child

Online Protection in its report to Congress stated that, "Voluntary methods and
technologies to protect children must be developed, tested, evaluated and made readily
available, ' 97 and the commission further called for "greater use of existing
technologies." 98 Eventually, as shown with other burgeoning products, the most efficient
and effective protective software will emerge through the natural process of the market
economy. It would be more prudent to patiently wait for the second and third generation
of protective software before allowing Congress to imprison the Internet through fullfledged regulation. Although there have been worthy arguments levied against userbased regulation, they do not rise to the level of seriousness as those arguments levied
against legislative and speaker-based regulation. Perhaps Winston Churchill's assertion
about democracy best sums up the Internet regulation dilemma, that is, protective
software is the worst form of Internet regulation, except for all the others.
IV. CONCLUSION
The overbreadth of the CDA and COPA, the unique borderless structure of the
Internet that makes it nearly impossible to keep certain communications limited to some
areas but not others, the economic burden of installing identification systems, and lack
of jurisdiction over foreign speakers makes parental or self-regulation a more reasonable
and workable solution to the problem of minors' access to indecent speech on the
Internet. However, there are certain things Congress can do to help which do not
involve regulation of content. For example, Congress could subsidize local community
efforts to train parents in the use of blocking software and require all Internet service
providers to come equipped with blocking options that parents can employ with a click
94. Weinberg, supra note 86, at 482 n.2 (1997) (citing Pornographyon the Internet: Straight talk from
the Family Research Counsel (radio broadcast transcript) (last modified July 3, 1996)).
95. See id. at 459-470.
96. Id. at 454 (quoting presidential statement).
97. Commission on Child Online Protection (COPA), Report to Congress 21 (2000).
98. Id.
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of the mouse.
It seems reasonable to take the responsibility to regulate away from those who do not
have control over minors' access to material on the Internet, thereby placing it in the
hands of parents. Asking web publishers or communicators to regulate that which they
cannot is really asking them to close up shop. Most people would agree that American
society is not ready to close off the Internet to a significant number of communicators,
even if their communication is of a lower form. Congress should, therefore, relinquish
its efforts to regulate communication on the Internet that is harmful to minors but
protected as to adults in favor of parental or user-based regulation.
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